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SYNONYMS 
Hysterical neurosis; histrionic personality disorder; conversion disorder; dissociation 
 
 
DEFINITION 
The concept of hysteria or conversion disorder, firmly anchored in psychoanalytic theory, 
postulates the emergence of physical symptoms as an unconscious attempt to resolve painful 
psychic conflicts. By adopting the role of a sick person unconsciously, the conflict remains 
and the symptoms are perpetuated. 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
History/Background 
 
Descriptions of  hysteria were included in ancient Greek medical texts. At that time, the 
disorder was thought to result from movement of the uterus from its normal position (hence 
the name of the condition). In the second century AD, Galen rejected the idea that the uterus 
had been displaced and suggested instead that the condition was caused by an undue retention 
of uterine secretions. Various forms of uterine pathology were generally thought to cause 
hysteria until the 17th century, when the English physician, Thomas Willis (1621 – 1675) 
suggested that hysteria was caused by a disorder of the brain. By the 19th century, the 
importance of predisposing constitutional and organic causes of this brain disorder were 
recognised, and it was accepted that strong emotion was the usual provoking cause.  
 
Charcot, a French neurologist in the late 19th century, believed that hysteria was caused by a 
functional disorder of the brain which caused symptoms also rendering patients susceptible to 
hypnosis so that new symptoms could be detected by suggestion. Charcot’s ideas were 
developed further by Pierre Janet, who proposed that the disorder in hysteria was a tendency 
to dissociate, that is to lose the normal integration between various parts of mental 
functioning, together with a restriction of personal awareness, so that the person became 
unaware of certain aspects of psychological functioning, which would otherwise be within his 
awareness [1]. Freud and his colleague Breuer studied patients with hysteria and reported 
their findings in a paper “On the psychical mechanisms of hysterical phenomena” [2]. In a 
subsequent monograph, Studies in Hysteria [3], Breuer and Freud suggested that hysteria was 
caused by emotionally charged ideas which had become lodged in the unconscious of the 
patient at some previous time, and which were excluded from conscious awareness by a 
process which the authors called repression. They summarized this idea in the phrase 
“hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” [2, p 7]. Freud suggested that the repressed 
ideas were usually sexual.  
 
After Janet, a wider view of the emotionally charged ideas that could cause hysteria was 
supported by findings from the First World War, when hysteria was observed as a response to 
the stressful experience of battle.  
 
The terms “dissociation” and “désaggregation” (“disaggregation”) were coined by Pierre 
Janet [4, 5]. Janet viewed the mental life of the individual as an aggregate of mental elements, 
which he described as “psychological automatisms”. Under normal circumstances, 
psychological automatisms are unified in nominal consciousness and are accessible to 
voluntary control. Under traumatic, stressful conditions, however, single automatisms may 
become split off – dissociated – from the rest of consciousness and exert their effects 
autonomously. Genetically transmitted temperamental traits as well as early experiences, 
together with the individual’s present physical condition define the capacity of a person for 
the mental integration of new information in general, and of traumatic experiences in 
particular.  
 
Janet’s model of dissociation is essentially based on the idea of a constitutional pre-
disposition to dissociation (“dégénerancance”). The individual’s premorbid vulnerability to 
dissociative disorders thus plays a decisive role. A dissociation, which is to be understood as 
passive, by no means requires an intense external trauma for it to be released. Rather, 
reactivity to exaggerate emotions, inherent in the individual’s personality, often exerts a 
traumatogenic effect and leads to the generation of a psychopathological disorder.  
 
The original position of Freud and Breuer (1895) is still very close to that of Janet. They too 
viewed traumatic exposure during a sensitive developmental phase and a pre-disposition to 
dissociative psychopathology as decisive. Like Janet, they also recognised the importance of 
autosuggestion, used as a defence against traumatic experiences, in the pathogenesis of 
dissociative syndromes, as well as the special role of hypnotic techniques in the treatment of 
this unique class of disorders.  
 
A major shift of emphasis took place with the conception of the dissociative disorders. The 
predominant idea was initially that of external events leading to traumatic excitation beyond 
the individual’s objective ability to cope and thus to a feeling of psychophysical helplessness. 
Later, Freud increasingly identified the strong influence of unconscious phantasies and the 
attribution of meaning to “traumatic situations”. What was originally thought of as an 
external, traumatic situation came to be viewed as an intra-psychic situation of danger, for 
which the ego can prepare itself in advance with controlled amounts of signal anxiety, and to 
which it can react with specific defence mechanisms, such as repression. While developing 
these ideas, Freud in no way denied the existence and clinical relevance of real trauma. Yet 
this concept of repression and defence neurosis became the leading paradigm of dynamic 
psychiatry in the following years and consigned Janet’s concept of dissociation to obscurity 
for many decades thereafter [6]. 
 
Kretschmer (1961) proposed an interpretation of the observation of hysterical disorders in 
wartime. He suggested that the symptoms resulted from an innate biological mechanism 
counteracting highly stressful experiences. He believed that hysterical symptoms could 
develop in psychologically stable people as a result of this “reflex” mechanism, and could 
subside rapidly when the stress receded.  
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Hilgard [7], making use of the newly developed concepts of cognitive psychology, proposed a 
neo-dissociative theory that had many points of contact with the psychology of Janet. In his 
model of the “divided consciousness”, the psyche is viewed as an organised system of mental 
structures controlling perceptual, cognitive and behavioural processes in different areas. 
These mental sub-systems bear a certain resemblance to Janet’s psychological automatisms, 
but may also be thought of as comparable to the modules and cognitive units postulated in the 
cognitive theories of parallel information processing. According to Hilgard, the central 
executive system may become dysfunctional and cease to integrate and organise the 
individual control structures, resulting in a state of divided consciousness. (Kapfhammer 
2001) [8]. 
 
 
Two major problems with the concept of hysteria have detracted from its clinical value. The 
first is the difficulty in establishing the occurrence, relevance and timing of a “sufficient” 
psychological stressor. The second is how to distinguish “unconscious” motivation from 
feigning. Faced with these difficulties and threatened by the fear of overlooking treatable 
neurological conditions, clinicians have opted for a diagnosis per exclusion, stating hysteria or 
conversion disorder only after detailed investigations have failed to find an alternative 
explanation for the symptoms [7]. 
 
 
Classification 
 
The two major systems of classification have adopted somewhat different ways of classifying 
the conditions formerly known as hysteria. In DSM-IV, two terms, conversion and 
dissociative disorder, are used. Conversion denotes cases in which physical symptoms are the 
principal manifestations of the disorder; whilst dissociative disorder denotes cases in which 
psychological symptoms are the principal manifestations. In ICD-10, both kinds of 
manifestation are called dissociative disorders (with the term conversion used as an 
alternative means of indicating the same meaning) (cf. Tab. 1).  
 
In DSM-IV, conversion disorders (those with physical symptoms) are classified under the 
rubric “somatoform disorder” (a rubric for mental disorders with mainly physical symptoms), 
while dissociative disorders have a rubric of their own. In ICD-10, all these disorders are 
classified together under the rubric “dissociative disorder”.  
 
In the modern psychiatric classification systems, the dominant characteristic of the diagnostic 
category of dissociative disorders is the partial or total loss of the integrative functions of 
consciousness, memory, personal identity and perception of the self and of the environment. 
These disorders were referred to in earlier diagnostic manuals as “hysterical neurosis of 
dissociative type”.  
 
 
Table 1 
Classification of dissociative or conversion disorders 
 
 
The term “histrionic personality disorder” can replace the term “hysterical personality 
disorder” (Histrio was an actor in ancient Rome). The historical forerunner of histrionic 
personality disorders was hysterical neurosis, which was always considered inconsistent and 
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multi-faceted, with conversion symptoms and dissociative phenomena at the forefront, and all 
descriptions have dwelled on the variety and diversity of the disorder. The term “hysteria” 
was abandoned as a category, not only because of discrimination and labelling problems, but 
also because it could not be shown that hysterical symptoms, as originally postulated, 
occurred primarily in Oedipus conflicts.  
 
The main characteristics of histrionic personality disorder are a strong need for attention and 
recognition, suggestibility and a tendency towards affective instability and superficiality. 
Histrionic personalities have a sense of atmosphere, but also tend to dramatise and to manifest 
falseness and coquetry. They are largely unable to maintain a consistent pursuit of goals and 
value-orientation and are therefore inconstant, especially in relationships with other people 
and partners. Their typical thinking has been called “impressionistic”. There is an increased 
tendency for identification and traits such as empathy, sensitivity and theatrical skills, which 
can be positive, but can also allow the individual to mimic a series of conditions. According 
to Nemiah [6], dissociation plays a central role where hysterical mechanisms of repression, 
denial and hyper-emotionality, identification and identity-shift can favour a “consciousness-
impairing” effect.  
 
 
The term “conversion” is derived from Freud’s hypothesis that the somatic symptoms is a 
symbolic solution of an unconscious conflict enabling a reduction of anxiety and the 
exclusion of the conflict from conscious awareness (a process called primary gain). Current 
theories stress the importance of social factors and regard conversion symptoms as a mal-
adaptive variance of normal processes which, in some circumstances, are culturally accepted 
or even encouraged (e.g. possession states). Belle indifference, an apparent lack of concern 
about the symptoms, was stressed in past accounts of the condition, but it is not an invariable 
feature.  
 
In DSM-IV this category denotes symptoms or deficits involving voluntary motor or sensory 
functions. 
 
Conversion disorder, as defined in DSM-IV, is much less common, with a reported 
prevalence of between 1 and 3% among patients referred to psychiatrists. However, short-
lived conversion syndromes, such as difficulty in walking or sensory complaints, are seen 
regularly in emergency departments.  
 
In DSM-IV, conversion disorder is divided as follows: 
• with motor symptoms or deficits (e.g. psychogenic paralysis, psychogenic disorder 
of gait, psychogenic tremor, psychogenic dysphonia and mutism and globus 
hystericus, a feeling of a lump in the throat) 
• with sensory symptoms or deficits (e.g. dissociative anaesthesia, paraesthesia, 
hypaeresthesia and pain, as well as deafness and blindness) 
• with seizures and convulsions (the patient does not become unconscious, the 
pattern of movements does not show a regular and stereotype form of seizure, and 
there is no incontinence, cyanosis or injury and the tongue is not bitten; EEG 
findings are normal). 
 
Assessment of conversion disorder depends on the patient’s history and an examination to 
ascertain the characteristic features, and on great caution in excluding neurological and other 
physical causes. 
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The cause of the condition is very variable. It is probable that most episodes are transient, but 
a minority have a chronic cause; reoccurrence is common.  
 
 
Etiology and pathogenesis 
 
There are, in essence, two conceptual approaches to the understanding of the causes of 
dissociative conditions:  
• a complex mode of reaction to an external trauma 
• certain primary personality attributes that can pre-dispose an individual to the 
occurrence of dissociation 
 
 
Dissociation as a reaction to trauma 
 
Many patients with dissociative disorders report having experienced a severe psychological 
trauma, mostly during their early development. The most serious traumas described include 
sexual and physical abuse, emotional neglect and deprivation. It must be kept in mind, 
however, that most of the data published on this topic were gathered retrospectively and may 
thus give a distorted picture of the reality. The researchers and therapists favouring the 
explanation of a true post-traumatic reaction are opposed by those preferring that of a 
genetically pre-disposed personality [8].  
 
A problem in many studies is the lack of distinction between different types of trauma, i.e. 
unexpected, single-event trauma versus continued or repeated exposure to trauma, or the 
presence or absence of protective compensation in a traumatized child. The relationship 
between trauma and dissociation indeed seems to be a close one, but it should not be thought 
of as linear or monocausal. The inter-relatedness of trauma, memory and dissocation should 
always be analysed on multiple levels, reflecting the dilemma of “historical” versus “narrative 
truth” [9].  
 
 
Trauma and the neurobiology of dissociation 
 
In the context of adjustment to a traumatic event, two basic modes of reaction may be 
distinguished. An individual typically reacts to an external threat with an alarm reaction 
consisting of an elevation of sympathetic tone in preparation for a basic fight- or flight- 
response pattern. This hyperarousal continuum is brought about mainly by the centrally driven 
peripheral secretion of epinephrine and norepinephrine, by the secretion of adrenal 
corticotrophic hormone (ACTH) and cortisol by the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) 
axis, and by activation of the immune system. 
 
On the other hand, a dissociative continuum is associated with a basic response pattern of 
surrender. It seems to be activated preferentially when an organised fight- or flight-response 
appears unlikely to succeed, or when this type of response is not yet fully developed, as in 
children. There is initially a stress-response with secretion of catecholamins and corticoids. 
However, in dissociation but not in hyperarousal, there is also a strong vagal activation. 
Moreover, the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopaminergic systems play an important role 
and, by way of the central reward systems, exert a primary influence on affect modulation. 
Collateral connections to the endogenious opioid system lead to a change in the perception of 
notious stimuli and also to a distortion of the sense of time, place and reality. 
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Both response patterns can be combined, to varying relative extents, in basic adaptive styles. 
A neurobiological inter-relationship of dissociation disorder and PTSD (post-traumatic stress 
disorder) is suggested by the fact that peri-traumatic dissociative symptoms have a high 
predictive value for the later development of PTSD.  
 
 
Hysterical conversion and brain function 
 
Hysterical conversion disorders represent “functional” or unexplained neurological deficits 
such as paralysis or somatosensory losses not explained by organic lesions in the nervous 
system, but arising in the context of “psychogenic” stress or emotional conflicts. Several 
recent studies have used functional brain imaging techniques (such as EEG, fMRI, PET or 
SPECT) in the attempt to identify specific neural correlates associated with hysterical 
conversion symptoms. Functional neuroimaging has revealed selective decreases in the 
activity of frontal and sub-cortical circuits involved in motor control during hysterical 
paralysis, decreases in somato-sensory cortexes during hysterical anasthesia, or decreases in 
visual cortex during hysterical blindness [10]. Such changes are usually not accompanied by 
any significant changes in elementary stages of sensory or motor processing, as measured by 
evoked potentials, although some changes in later stages of integration (such as P300 
responses) have been reported. On the other hand, several neuroimaging results have shown 
increased activation in limbic regions, such as cingulate or orbito-frontal cortex during 
conversion symptoms, effecting different sensory or motor modalities. Taken together, these 
data generally do not support previous proposals that hysteria might involve an exclusion of 
sensory motor representations from awareness through attentional processes. Rather, they 
seem to point to a modulation of such representations by primary affective or stress-related 
factors, perhaps involving primitive reflexive mechanisms of protection and alertness that are 
partly independent of conscious control, and mediated by dynamic modulatory interactions 
between limbic and sensori-motor networks.  
 
A better understanding of the neuropsychobiological basis of hysterical conversion disorder 
might therefore be obtained through future imaging studies comparing different conversion 
symptoms and employing functional connectivity analysis. This could also provide new 
insights into the brain mechanisms of self-awareness. 
 
 
A contemporary re-conceptualisation of hysteria 
 
Yarom [11] presented a matrix of hysteria, which is a contemporary re-reading of Freud’s 
basic conceptualisation. It integrated oedipal concepts (referring to unconscious conflicts in 
the triangular relationship between both parents and the child) with others borrowed from 
object-relation theories, self-psychology and the inter-subjective approach. In this way, the 
focus of the issues of gender and sexuality in hysteria has been continued without the original 
roots being lost. The focus is on the content, the structure may vary. Within the first axis of 
the matrix, Yarom proposes identifying the conflict of gender and sexual identity as the 
unconscious and conscious solutions adopted by a hysteric to the question “Am I a man or a 
woman?”. Repression and conversion are incorporated to constitute the second and third axes 
of the matrix. Several defence mechanisms (repression, denial, dissociation and phantasy) are 
shown to be employed in the context of gender and sexuality, and along a continuum of 
personality structures. In this context, the turning to the body, the conversion, still acts as an 
effective language, to which therapists should listen.  
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Psychotherapy 
 
There is a consensus among experts that treatments should be planned and provided largely 
on an individual basis. Psychotherapeutic strategies are generally preferred to biological 
approaches. In view of the importance of severe trauma in the etiology and pathogenesis of 
both the simple and, in particular, complex dissociative disorders, emphasis should be placed 
on avoiding the danger of inducing further trauma through therapeutic measures. The 
treatment of a comorbid psychiatric disorder is geared towards the therapeutic standard for 
that particular disorder. Syndrome-oriented, mainly psychopharmacological treatment of this 
psychiatric comorbidity may become a priority when psychiatric emergencies arise or when 
access to the patient is blocked by the comorbidity, so that the selected form of psychotherapy 
can not be performed.  
 
For acute dissociative and conversion disorders seen in general practice or hospital casualty 
departments, treatment by reassurance and suggestion is usually appropriate, together with 
immediate efforts to resolve any stressful circumstances that provoked the reaction. The 
general approach is to focus on the elimination of factors reinforcing the symptoms. It should 
be explained to the patient that he/she has a disability (as in remembering or moving arms and 
legs) not caused by physical disease but by psychological factors. 
 
Patients with dissociative and conversion disorders often appear to respond well to 
psychodynamic psychotherapy or to psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysts working with hysteric 
patients find themselves in unconscious communication with the patient. The psychoanalyst 
may experience in his/her reveries that he/she is moved by particular mental contents narrated 
by the patient, and when the psychoanalyst echoes them, the patient usually responds by 
producing further material. This collaboration is of enormous importance in the outcome of 
such analysis, as the patient is a creatively contributing psychic partner to the psychoanalyst 
[12]. 
 
By interpreting transfer and counter-transfer processes, the therapeutic relationship is 
supposed to deal not only with the Oedipus conflict, but also with desires for attention and 
care.  
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